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ARTICLE
THE PRESSURES OF BILLABLE HOURS:
LESSONS FROM A SURVEY OF BILLING
PRACTICES INSIDE LAW FIRMS
CHRISTINE PARKER* AND DAVID RUSCHENA**
“From now on I’m thinking only of me.”
Major Danby replied indulgently with a superior smile: “But,
Yossarian, suppose everyone felt that way.”
“Then,” said Yossarian, “I’d certainly be a damned fool to think
any other way, wouldn’t I?”1
INTRODUCTION
Do lawyers’ experiences of time-based billing and billable hour budg-
ets subject them to pressures that encourage unethical practices? This paper
argues that billable hour pressure is merely the face of more fundamental
pressures stemming from the way that lawyers in private practice perceive
their work environments. Even without excessive billable hour targets, law-
yers will probably be more likely to engage in unethical behavior when they
believe that such behavior is necessary to meet performance indicators, that
everyone within their firm is engaging in such behavior, and that there is no
other way to succeed at the firm—whether or not their beliefs are correct.
The interventions necessary to prevent billing fraud must deal with lawyers’
perceptions and not merely the billable hours regimes in which lawyers
work. Indeed, quite fundamental reform of the way firms manage their law-
yers and communicate expectations about billing and ethics are necessary to
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** PhD Candidate, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne.
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achieve an environment that is healthier for lawyers and less exploitative
for clients.
This paper examines these issues through data from the Queensland
Billing Practices Survey, run by the Legal Services Commission in Queen-
sland, Australia. Lawyers from twenty-five private law firms answered
questions about the billing systems, office culture, and ethics policies of
their firms.
Section I reviews the literature on lawyers’ ethics and billable hours.
Section II describes the Queensland Billing Practices Survey, the data we
obtained from the Survey, and why these data are helpful. Sections III, IV,
and V set out the findings from the Survey. Section III examines the billing
systems in which the lawyer-respondents work and the degree to which they
feel their performance is assessed by reference to their budgetary perform-
ance. Section IV considers respondents’ perceptions of unethical billing
practices in their firms and the extent to which they personally feel ethical
pressure from time-based billing. Section V considers law firms’ attempts
to establish ethics policies to counter unethical billing practices.
Section VI applies the lessons from the Survey to the interventions
commonly suggested as appropriate to reduce unethical billing.
I. BILLABLE HOURS AND UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR
A. The Postulated Ethical Impact of Billable Hours
The ethical impact of time-based billing has been extensively debated
within the academy2 and the profession.3 According to critics, the use of
billable hours can be unfair to both practitioners and their clients.
High billable hour expectations can have a negative effect on lawyers’
personal lives, professional development, and capacity to engage in pro
2. For discussions on both sides of the debate within the academy, see generally CHRISTINE
PARKER & ADRIAN EVANS, INSIDE LAWYERS’ ETHICS (2007); Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale:
An Empirical Study of Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Require-
ments, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239 (2000) [hereinafter Fortney, Soul for Sale]; Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-
Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205
(1999); William G. Ross, Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2199 (1998)
[hereinafter Ross, Kicking the Habit]; William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys,
44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Ross, Ethics of Hourly Billing].
3. For discussions on both sides of the debate within the profession, see generally AMERI-
CAN BAR ASS’N, ABA COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT (2002), available at http://www.
judicialaccountability.org/articles/ABABillableHours2002.pdf; Mark Rigotti, Billing Structure
Should Meet Client Needs, THE AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 27, 2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/
business/legal-affairs/billing-structure-should-meet-client-needs/story-e6frg97x-1225910603852;
Kate Gibbs, Firms’ Budgets Behind Billing Fraud, LAWYERS WEEKLY, Nov. 18, 2005; Kate
Gibbs, Hours of (Billable) Justice, LAWYERS WEEKLY, Apr. 6, 2007; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.5 (1996); Clyde Croft, Aon and its implications for the Commercial Court, (Aug.
19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Supreme Court of Victoria library); James
Spigelman, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Speech at the Opening of Law
Term Dinner (Feb. 2, 2004).
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bono work.4 Especially when work is scarce, practitioners can feel pressure
to bill more and more on the same files, and they might achieve this by
over-working, over-servicing, or, in some cases, falsifying the amount of
time spent on a file.5 Lawyers who are judged (or feel they are judged) only
by the number of hours they record may not be rewarded for dealing with
matters more efficiently or bringing special skills or relevant experience to
the matter. This may result in the employee-lawyer who feels budgetary
pressure, rather than the senior lawyer directly responsible to the client,
“deciding what work is necessary and appropriate” on each file in order to
control—and increase—his or her own hours.6
From a client’s point of view, billable hours provide a simple and fa-
miliar means of calculating fees but ignore whether the lawyer’s work actu-
ally furthers the client’s interests.7 Lawyers who bill on an hourly basis
have limited incentives to engage in case planning and have a specific in-
centive to adopt defensive over-servicing and strategies.8 Even in the ab-
sence of fraud, clients run the risk of paying for inefficient lawyering, costs
incurred in training junior lawyers, turnover, and aggressive time record-
ing.9 More generally, time-based billing provides clients with little or no
predictability about cost. Without further information, clients (especially
unsophisticated clients) have no ability to check whether the services for
which they are charged are necessary to the matter and efficiently per-
formed.10 It is also easier for the lawyer to raise the fees when charging by
the hour rather than per matter because the hourly increase seems small.
1. Assumptions About How Billable Hours Cause Lawyers to
Behave Unethically
The potential for the problems described above is clear and well docu-
mented. Many authors assert that the increase in billable hour targets that
4. Robert Hirshon, Preface to ABA COMM’N. ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT, supra note 3, at
ix.
5. See Douglas R. Richmond, For a Few Dollars More: The Perplexing Problem of Unethi-
cal Billing Practices by Lawyers, 60 S.C. L. REV. 63, 86 (2008) (“So long as a firm has sufficient
billable work and has a system that suitably distributes assignments, lawyers whose chief value to
the firm is as timekeepers should be secure in their positions if their performance meets the firm’s
standards in terms of competence, diligence and so on.”).
6. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at 43.
7. See id. at 7–8.
8. See id. at 5–6.
9. For example, the billable hour makes it easier to justify charging out junior lawyers to
perform work that could have been completed more efficiently by a senior lawyer, despite the
senior lawyer’s higher billable rate. See Jesse Nelman, Current Development 2009–2010: A Little
Trust Can Go a Long Way Toward Saving the Billable Hour, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 717,
718–19 (2010); see also AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that overreliance on
billable hours causes clients to essentially pay for associate training).
10. See Lisa G. Lerman, A Double Standard for Lawyer Dishonesty: Billing Fraud Versus
Misappropriation, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 870 (2006); Bret Walker, Proportionality and Cost-
Shifting, 27 U.N.S.W. L.J. 214, 217 (2006).
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accompanied increases in lawyers’ salaries, especially in the United States
leading up to the Global Economic Crisis of 2007, exacerbated these
problems.11 Yet unethical practices associated with billing may well con-
tinue even where hourly billing is replaced by another method.
Joseph La Rue suggests that lawyers’ professional lives have become
“dominated by the time sheet”12 for many reasons, including: “the ever-
present desire to maximize profits”; “the gradual realization that attorneys
could make more money from the labor of others than they could from their
own labor alone”; “the advent of large law firms as a way to harness that
extra labor”; and “the pressure on managing partners to make firms profita-
ble, which meant that associates had to produce income equal to roughly
three times their salary.”13 These factors all exist no matter what billing
regime is in place.
Similarly, Richmond argues lawyers overbill due to a number of moti-
vations,14 only one of which directly relates to hourly billing regimes: igno-
rance of acceptable standards of conduct, professional insecurity, the
absence of a meaningful bond with the firm, lawyers’ competitiveness,
compensation systems that directly reward high billable hours, an almost
adversarial approach to dealings with clients, greed and envy, and mental
illness and substance abuse.15
Kritzer, too, suggests, on the basis of his empirical literature review,
that unethical behavior is not a function of any particular fee arrangement.16
Rather, it is linked to “issues such as marginality of practice, client pres-
sures, practice context (i.e., what courts or agencies a lawyer practices
before), and the social context of a particular law firm.”17 Fee arrangements
might influence the specific nature of lawyers’ unethical behavior but not
the likelihood of such behavior generally.18
11. See Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 891 (1999).
12. Joseph E. La Rue, Redeeming the Lawyer’s Time: A Proposal for a Shift in How Attor-
neys Think About—and Utilize—Time, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 473, 483
(2006).
13. Id. The other reasons are: “the invention of the computer and time management
software”; “the gradual realization that attorneys could make more money billing by the hour than
with any other method”; and “the acceptance of billing by the hour by the courts.” Id.
14. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 81.
15. See id. at 82–99; Ross, Ethics of Hourly Billing, supra note 2, at 3 n.6.
16. Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the
Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1979 (2002).
17. Id. at 1979–80.
18. See also Brian Bartley, Fair Trade? Why We Need to Rethink Time Billing, PROCTOR,
Sept. 2010, at 12 (“The reality is that there is no system of charging which is not open to abuse—
or which can work perfectly well, if applied fairly.”); Duncan Webb, Killing Time: A Limited
Defence of Time-Cost Billing, 13 LEGAL ETHICS 39, 39 (2010) (“The problem of developing a
uniform billing framework which is effective, economically defensible and ethical is in fact intrac-
table. That is to say, there is no unified solution.”).
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A billable hours regime, however, does have the potential to take on a
life of its own in the mind of employed lawyers. The sheer quantifiability of
a billable hours budget makes it a more obvious and salient indicator of
performance than other less choate measures of quality.19 Professional gos-
sip or cynicism20 may add to the employee-lawyer’s sense that billable
hours are all-important performance measures. Billable hours then become
the prism through which other pressures are refracted and magnified. This
will be further exacerbated where lawyers work in firms with people who
see ethically questionable behavior as “the way lawyers do things” or “the
way we do things around here.”21
This makes it important to look at the social environment of the firms
in which lawyers work. In the following two subsections we discuss two
features of law firms that might support unethical behavior:22 the extent of
competition and greed within a law firm and ignorance of appropriate ethi-
cal practices. These can influence lawyers’ understanding about what they
need to do to “get ahead” and what they are allowed to do without acting
unethically.
B. Competition and Greed
Lawyers use compensation and billing rates as a means of denoting
status within a law firm.23 Patrick Schiltz argues that lawyers are often high
achievers who are used to competing and succeeding and desire the status
that achievement brings.24 The lawyer’s capacity to generate income (for
herself and for her firm) may be the only indicator as to whether she is good
at the job.25 The pressure this places on lawyers is all the more acute when
compensation varies with management’s assessment of lawyers’ contribu-
tions to the firm, which in many cases is evaluated mainly by whether the
lawyers reached their billable hour targets (rather than the quality and quan-
19. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
302 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
20. A number of studies suggest that young lawyers become quite cynical about the ideals of
legal practice by the time they finish law school. See, e.g., Howard S. Erlanger, Charles R. Epp,
Mia Cahill & Kathleen M. Haines, Law Student Idealism and Job Choice: Some New Data on an
Old Question, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 851 (1996); Andrew Goldsmith, Warning: Law School Can
Endanger Your Health!, 21 MONASH U. L. REV. 272 (1995).
21. PARKER & EVANS, supra note 2, at 10.
22. Over-billing and bill padding are equally as dishonest as misappropriation of client funds:
in both cases the lawyer is “wrongfully taking client funds for his own use.” Lerman, supra note
10, at 874. However, the results discussed below show that this view is not held universally
amongst practicing lawyers.
23. See Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to Greed to Dishonesty: Lawyers,
Money, and Professional Integrity, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 879, 881 n.9 (2002); Richmond, supra
note 5, at 90.
24. See Schiltz, supra note 11, at 904–06.
25. Id.
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tity of the actual work provided to the client).26 In order to maintain the
feeling of success, lawyers take high-paying jobs despite knowing the bur-
den this will place on them.27 Lisa Lerman argues that compensation cre-
ates a vicious circle of competition and a means of salving the hurts that
excessive competition inflicts upon lawyers’ professional lives.28
The pressure to generate income and the compensation for generating
income are the fundamental issues—billable hours might simply be a pow-
erful conduit of those pressures. Problems with competitiveness and greed
exist as soon as a lawyer’s fees are measured, whether through billable
hours or some other accounting method. Even if a particular lawyer does
not personally feel the pressure to be competitive about compensation, he or
she might still feel pressure from a sense that the firm is only interested in
the amount of fees he or she generates. As such, pressure to inflate fees will
cease only if a lawyer’s revenue production is not considered at all for the
purposes of her promotion or remuneration.
C. Ignorance of Appropriate Ethical Practices
Lawyers may also fail to consider whether bill padding and inflation
are actually unethical. There are a number of reasons to think that this is so.
First, law students’ education about ethical issues may amount to no more
than a study of the rules of professional practice.29 This can encourage the
view that the rules are exhaustive of all types of ethical and unethical con-
duct, which means, by corollary, that any conduct that does not violate the
rules is “ethical.”30
Second, lawyers facing disciplinary proceedings for bill padding fre-
quently argue that they merely intended to charge the client a premium, that
they were unaware of firm policy, and that they did not intend to deceive
the firm or the client about the total amount legitimately owed.31 Such igno-
26. For discussions of this idea, see generally Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 2, at 239;
Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems and Pressure
Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171 (2005) [hereinafter Fortney, Billable Hours]; Lerman, supra
note 2, at 241, 266; Lerman, supra note 10, at 847; Ross, Kicking the Habit, supra note 2, at 2199;
Ross, Ethics of Hourly Billing, supra note 2; Kritzer, supra note 16.
27. There is no shortage of graduates willing to work at large firms, thus submitting to a
professional lifestyle that is widely reviled. “The hiring partner of any major firm will tell you that
if his firm offers first year associates a salary of $69,000, and a competitor down the street offers
them $72,000, those who have the choice will flock to the competitor—even if the competitor will
require them to bill 200 hours more each year.” Schiltz, supra note 11, at 898.
28. Lerman, supra note 23, at 889.
29. See Lisa G. Lerman, Teaching Moral Perception and Moral Judgment in Legal Ethics
Courses: A Dialogue About Goals, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 457, 463–64 (1998); David Luban &
Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31,
39 (1995); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS
(1998).
30. Schiltz, supra note 11, at 908–09.
31. See Lerman, supra note 10, at 853–54, 857. Nelman supports this view, suggesting that
“abusive billing may actually be the result of both billing ignorance and poor billing judgment,
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rance, where it exists, has a number of facets. The first is ignorance of the
strict rules of the legal profession—which prohibit billing fraud and exces-
sive billing—and how they apply in practical situations. The second is igno-
rance of billing practices within the lawyer’s firm, which presumably would
not tolerate improper billing, if only due to the risk of losing the client. The
third, and most important for the purposes of this paper, is ignorance of
what other lawyers are actually doing. Few lawyers will have clear informa-
tion about other lawyers’ billing practices; their beliefs are much more
likely to be based on rumor and innuendo. All of these factors contribute to
lawyers’ beliefs about what behavior is necessary, possible, and socially
acceptable.
Lawyers engaging in unethical billing practices may therefore manifest
“Yossarian’s response” that—given the lawyer’s understanding of the firm
and her colleagues—she would be “a damned fool”32 to do things any other
way. The lawyer’s perception need not have any basis in reality in order for
it to support unethical conduct.
D. Previous Empirical Research
Previous research has described how lawyers experience the outcome
of these pressures. In 2005, Susan Fortney interviewed and surveyed 1,138
managing attorneys and 4,649 supervised attorneys on a range of issues
including billing practices.33 Fortney hypothesized that firms imposing min-
imum billing targets are likely to encourage a culture of overcharging.34
Respondents were clear that their prospects of both annual bonuses and
promotions were directly linked to the extent they exceeded minimum bill-
ing targets.35 Similarly, Corbin’s analysis of her interviews with junior and
senior lawyers in Queensland law firms “shows that the graduates feel pres-
sured by firm culture, but more specifically budgetary policies, which in
their view limit their ability to provide a quality service to clients.”36 Lisa
Lerman has also found that adding hours to time sheets and charging undis-
closed premiums as hours is “commonplace.”37
In 1991, William Ross published the results of a survey of 272 private
practitioners and eighty corporate counsel practicing throughout the United
which are sustained by an environmental pressure for lawyers to conform to the unethical billing
practices of their colleagues. Put simply, lawyers may not know the practices they employ are
unethical.” Nelman, supra note 9, at 722.
32. See HELLER, supra note 1, at 455.
33. Fortney, Billable Hours, supra note 26, at 174.
34. See id. at 175.
35. See id. at 176–78.
36. Lillian Corbin, How “Firm” are Lawyers’ Perceptions of Professionalism?, 8 LEGAL
ETHICS 265, 276 (2005).
37. Lerman, supra note 10, at 882.
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States.38 There was general agreement about the effect of billable hours on
ethics: 7.2% of private practitioners and 7% of corporate counsel respon-
dents indicated their belief that time-based billing “substantially” or “very
substantially” encourages fraud, while another 27.4% of private practition-
ers and 37.5% of corporate counsel respondents indicated that time-based
billing had a moderate effect.39 Differences between the two sets of respon-
dents emerged, however, when they described the effect that billable hour
regimes had on lawyers’ efficiency: corporate counsel were much more
likely than private practitioners to indicate that time-based billing dimin-
ishes efficiency.40
This discrepancy appears to be based on different understandings of
the ethics of time-based billing. Private practitioners were much more likely
than corporate counsel to agree with the statement that “it is ethical for an
attorney to bill a client for work (e.g., research of drafting) that originally
was undertaken for another client and has been ‘re-cycled’ for the second
client” even if “the second client is billed on the basis of time and is not
informed that the work was ‘re-cycled.’”41 Similarly, corporate counsel
were much more likely than private practitioners to see it as unethical to bill
a client for travel time during which the lawyer is able to bill another client
for work.42 These differences are remarkable considering that corporate
counsel often start off as private practitioners. It supports the theory that
lawyers in private practice are either not educated about the ethical conse-
quences of their billing behavior or are socialized to ignore it. Corporate
counsel, by contrast, learn to understand ethical consequences from a cli-
ent’s perspective.
E. Need for Further Empirical Analysis
Two issues would therefore benefit from further empirical analysis.
The first is whether time-based billing puts greater ethical pressure on law-
yers and leads to more unethical behavior than other billing systems. Pri-
vate practices exist so that partners can make a profit, and it would still be
easy to quantify and compare the fees each lawyer earns regardless of the
system used to calculate those fees. If so, complaints about billable hours
requirements are focusing on a problem that is a proxy for deeper forces.
Changes in billing methods alone may not necessarily reduce competition
and overcharging.
38. Ross, Ethics of Hourly Billing, supra note 2, at 5. See id. n.16 for a description of the
survey methodology.
39. Id. at 5–6 nn.16–17.
40. Id. Similar results occurred when respondents were asked to speculate about what would
happen to lawyers’ bills if time-based billing were replaced by an alternative. More than 40% of
corporate counsel stated that they believed that the replacement would tend to “moderately” de-
crease bills; only 9.3% of private practitioners indicated that this was the case. Id. at 85.
41. Id. at 39.
42. Id. at 58.
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The second issue is therefore the degree to which the pattern of social
and economic relations within a firm influences ethical behavior in relation
to billing. Ethical misconduct may be the result of an individual lawyer’s
perceptions about what is acceptable and widespread practice in her firm.
Where lawyers are financially rewarded almost solely on the basis of billa-
ble hours generated or clients attracted to the firm, firms might institute
policies and processes aimed at reducing unethical behavior or they might
tacitly encourage padding and overcharging. Firms may encourage discus-
sion of ethical and unethical practices in billing, or they may allow fee
earners to arrive at their own conclusions—some of which might be quite
cynical.
This study aims to address these two issues using data from a survey of
Queensland law firms and their lawyers. The survey and research strategy
are described in the next section.
II. THE QUEENSLAND BILLING PRACTICES CHECK SURVEY
A. Purpose and Design of the Billing Practices Check Survey
The Queensland Legal Services Commission (LSC) is the independent,
single gateway complaints-handler and disciplinary prosecutor for the
Queensland legal profession.43 It receives complaints about lawyers from
clients and others, which it can either dismiss, seek to resolve, or take disci-
plinary or other action upon.44 Dealing with complaints, however, is largely
reactive and the extent to which complaint-handling activities can prevent
further complaints from arising is limited.45 Therefore, the LSC also has a
number of strategies to proactively help improve standards of conduct in the
legal profession and prevent complaints from arising in the first place, in-
cluding a suite of “ethics checks” for law firms.46 The Billing Practices
43. All external complaints about legal practitioners in Queensland are supposed to be passed
to the LSC, as opposed to being handled by the professional associations, which previously had
the role of handling complaints against lawyers.
44. See Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ch 4 (Austl.); see also State of Queensland, Wel-
come to the Legal Services Commission, LEGAL SERVS. COMM’N, http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/ (last
visited Oct. 11, 2011) (providing additional general information regarding the LSC).
45. The LSC can, and does, craft responses to complaints that are aimed toward improving
conduct and not just punishing misconduct by encouraging remedial action for example. But by
the time a complaint reaches an external regulator like the LSC, the damage has been done and the
regulator can only do so much to affect repair and achieve further damage limitation.
46. The Workplace Culture Check was the first ethics check developed for law firms. It
included questions in relation to the ethical infrastructure and workplace culture inside law firms.
Subsequently, the LSC developed two further ethics checks, the Billing Practices Survey and the
Complaints Management Survey. The Complaints Management Survey was initially developed as
part of the regulatory scheme for incorporated legal practices as a way to audit ethical infrastruc-
ture in incorporated legal practice. It was labelled as an “ethics check” to emphasize that the focus
was not on checking whether appropriate management systems were in place, but rather on the
more cultural aspects of a firm’s approach and arrangements for complaints management. All
three ethics check surveys are available on the LSC’s website at http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/546.
htm along with further information about how they are used and the results of the surveys. For an
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-2\UST213.txt unknown Seq: 10 21-DEC-12 13:00
628 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:2
Survey (“the Survey”) is one such check. While reactive complaint-han-
dling can sometimes be adversarial between regulators, consumers, and the
profession, more proactive approaches, including the Survey, involve col-
laboration. The ethics check surveys are intended to promote reflection, dis-
cussion, and, where appropriate, organizational change in relation to how
lawyers handle a number of ethical, professional conduct, and consumer
issues in their practices.
The Survey particularly drew on Susan Fortney’s previous research on
billable hours and their impact on ethics.47 The Survey questions fall into
four broad categories:48
1. Questions relating to billing practices inside law firms, includ-
ing the use of time-based billing and other methods of billing.
2. Questions relating to management policies and practices that
might put pressure on practitioners to bill higher and to engage in
unethical conduct to ensure higher bills. These questions also in-
vestigate the extent to which lawyers’ performance is measured
and managed by reference to the amount they bill and whether
bonuses are paid for exceeding billable hour targets.
3. Questions relating to management policies and practices inside
law firms that seek to ensure that billing practices comply with
conduct rules, are understood and consented to by clients, and
aim to deter, detect, or prevent unethical conduct in billing. These
include a number of specific questions about how lawyers and
firms communicate with clients about fees and billing, how the
firm determines bills, how different practices are billed, and also
a series of more general questions about whether the firm has
ethics policies and training in place.
4. Questions relating to the “ethical outcomes”49 of firms’ billing
practices and management policies, including whether practition-
ers feel substantial pressure to bill, whether they have observed
instances of unethical conduct, and how they would respond to
hypothetical scenarios of difficult billing decisions.
in-depth discussion of the methodology and results of the Workplace Culture Check, see Christine
Parker & Lyn Aitken, The Queensland “Workplace Culture Check”: Learning from Reflection on
Ethics Inside Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 399 (2011) [hereinafter Parker, Learning from
Reflection]. For a description of the methodology of the Complaints Management Survey and
discussion of its results, see Christine Parker & Linda Haller, Inside Running: Internal Complaints
Management Practice and Regulation in the Legal Profession, 38 MONASH U. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing) [hereinafter Parker, Inside Running]. For a general discussion of the rationale and methodol-
ogy for this approach by the LSC, see John Briton & Scott McLean, Incorporated Legal
Practices: Dragging the Regulation of the Legal Profession into the Modern Era, 11 LEGAL ETH-
ICS 241 (2008).
47. See Fortney, Billable Hours, supra note 26. See also discussion supra notes 42–45.
48. For the full survey questionnaire, see LEGAL SERVS. COMM’N, BILLING PRACTICES SUR-
VEY, available at http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/projects/Billing_Practices_Survey_2010_230410.pdf.
49. This is the authors’ term, not the term used in the survey.
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The aim of the Survey was to raise awareness within law firms of the
way that certain billing practices might lead to pressure to engage in unethi-
cal conduct and the policies and techniques law firms might use to alleviate
those pressures. The Survey was also intended to raise lawyers’ conscious-
ness of informal or unspoken assumptions in their firms about appropriate
billing practices, as well as to encourage lawyers to critically reflect on
whether their assumptions were justified and universally shared.
Finally, the Survey was intended to promote discussion within firms
about these issues and, as a result, to prompt change in both individual and
law firm attitudes and practices as appropriate. It was not intended to be a
one-way conversation; that is, it was not designed to be a rigidly prescrip-
tive checklist for good billing practices. The LSC hoped that lawyers and
law firms could profitably use the Survey questions as a check of what they
were doing. The focus, however, was primarily on uncovering the knowl-
edge and attitudes of various members of the profession in relation to the
billing practices operating within their firms in order to facilitate genuine
conversations about appropriate billing.50 The Survey methodology was
also designed to allow the regulator to learn from law firms about how they
themselves manage billing.
The online survey instrument enabled systematic collection of the data
that could be provided back to the firms. Each firm that participated re-
ceived results comparing how different levels of staff answered the survey
questions and how it compared with other participating firms. The Survey
was designed primarily as a kind of “participatory action research”51 rather
than for the purposes of “inferential research.”52 That is, the LSC’s purpose
in developing the Survey was not to conduct systematic social science re-
search capable of supporting generalization. Rather, it was to encourage
lawyers and law firms to reflect on and discuss their firms’ billing practices
and ethics policies more generally, and the (differing) perceptions of the
ethical requirements and impacts of billing practices within the firm.
Data generated by participatory action research like this across a wide
enough range of cases can be used to draw at least weak inferences about
likely patterns or relationships where the patterns and relationships in the
data are so strong that it is unlikely they could be explained any other
50. Parker, Learning from Reflection, supra note 46.
51. For a discussion of participatory action research, see Kurt Lewin, Action Research and
Minority Problems, 2 J. SOC. ISSUES 34, 34–46 (1946); see also Colin Eden & Chris Huxham,
Researching Organizations Using Action Research, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION
STUDIES 388 (Stewart R. Clegg et al. eds., 2d ed. Sage Publ’g 2006); see generally PAULO FREIRE,
PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., Continuum Publ’g Co. 1990) (co-
learning and action based on critical reflection); Orlando Fals-Borda, The Application of Par-
ticipatory Action-Research in Latin America, 2 INT’L SOC. 329 (1987) (refining the approach in
Latin America).
52. See generally ALAN BRYMAN, SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the
requirements of inferential social research).
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way.53 It is also possible to use these data to throw doubt on theories where
patterns and relationships in the data are completely inconsistent with that
theory. The observer must be very careful, however, to pay attention to both
the research tool that generated the data, the sample, and the response rate
in determining what inferences can be drawn.
There may be some social desirability bias in the responses to the Sur-
vey. The tone of the Survey may have influenced respondents to emphasize
their own ethical behavior or they may have sought to convey views that
they thought might accord with the views of either the LSC or the manage-
ment of their firms. The Survey was conducted anonymously, however, and
many respondents took the opportunity to write negatively of their firm or
of the Survey methodology itself.54 Accordingly, there is reason to believe
that social desirability bias was not so great as to undermine the results
generally.
B. Use of the Survey Data in This Paper
In this paper, we use the data from the Survey to examine:
1. The extent to which lawyers report that their firms use each of
three different billing systems—billable hours, fixed fee arrange-
ments, or contingency fees—and the extent to which they per-
ceive that their firms use billable hours to assess and motivate
their performance. The results are reported in Section III below.
2. The extent to which lawyers have different perceptions and ex-
periences of ethical pressures and concerns emanating from their
firms’ billing practices. We also consider as far as possible
whether these ethical pressures and concerns differ in firms with
different billing practices. The results are reported in Section IV
below.
3. Whether firms seek to ameliorate any false signals sent out by
hourly billing and performance measurement on the basis of such
billing by implementing policies and systems to infuse ethical
values into billing and practice more generally and whether these
measures actually result in better perceptions, experiences, and
ethical outcomes. The results are reported in Section V below.
To answer these questions, it is not necessary for the Survey responses
to accurately reflect what is actually happening at the respondent’s firm.
Rather, it is important that the Survey be capable of capturing respondents’
perceptions about firm practices and the resulting pressures they feel. This
is the general thrust of the Survey.
53. See Parker, Learning from Reflection, supra note 46, at 412–18 (offering a fuller argu-
ment on this point).
54. Social desirability may not be much of a concern if a respondent feels able to write: “This
survey is a waste of my time and other members of the firm. We will not participate again.”
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It is equally important that we consider not only individual perceptions
but also whole firms. We want to know whether individuals in the same
firm tend to have consistent or varying perceptions of the billing practices
of the firm and of the ethical values and policies around billing. Consis-
tency, or lack thereof, among individuals within the firm gives us a sense of
how well the leadership of the firm communicates its ethics, policies, and
values. Firm leaders may feel that the ethical values of their firm are clear,
but, as we will show, our data uncovers a large degree of variation in indi-
viduals’ perceptions of firm policies and values within the same firm. This
may mean that individual lawyers feel uncertain and unsupported in apply-
ing ethical judgment to billing matters. We suggest that the ethical character
of billing is as much a characteristic of the practices of the firm as a whole
as it is a characteristic of the circumstances of the individual.
C. Participants in the Survey
The LSC wrote to the managing partners or directors of all 172 law
firms in Queensland with seven or more legal practitioners to invite them to
complete the billing practices check during April and May 2010. Forty
firms accepted the invitation to take part in the Survey by the end of May
2010, resulting in 517 responses. Data cleaning for the purposes of the anal-
ysis in this paper, however, resulted in 324 responses from twenty-five
firms. As explained further below, the purpose was to create a robust data
set with valid information about cultures and practices of firms as a whole,
as well as about individuals’ perceptions.
In order to participate in the Survey, law firms needed to ask all their
employees—or at least representative samples of the different levels and
classifications of employees, including those in branch offices—to com-
plete the Survey anonymously online. Anonymity for participating staff and
confidentiality for the firms was critically important to the success of the
Survey in achieving both a good response rate and honest answers. The
LSC did not deal directly with the individuals who completed the Survey,
and the firms themselves participated anonymously through a coding pro-
cess.55 This meant that the LSC and the researchers could not identify
which responses came from which particular firm.
For the purposes of the analyses in this paper, the data have been cle-
aned in order to focus on the practices and perceptions of fee earners; that
55. Firms that participated in the survey were invited to preserve their firms’ anonymity by
identifying the firm in each survey response by means of a secret and self-selected code. Each
individual respondent used the code in responding to the survey. The survey manager for each
firm could access their own firm’s aggregate results online using a unique code, but the results
available to the LSC (and researchers) show only the code for each firm, not the firm name. Each
individual participated completely anonymously. The firm survey manager could see only aggre-
gate results for his or her firm.
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is, lawyers who have some responsibility for billing.56 We did not include
firms with fewer than five practitioners responding to the Survey because
we were interested in examining the impact of firm practices and cultures
on individuals. Similarly, because we want an accurate view of the practices
and cultures in the firms we examine, we have also disregarded from the
sample all those firms where an insufficient proportion of practitioners from
the whole firm answered the Survey.57
The following subsection summarizes the characteristics of the 324 in-
dividual respondents and twenty-five firms included in this analysis. It is
important to note that not all respondents answered all the questions in the
Survey. As a result, the total number of responses differs between ques-
tions, and the proportion of answers will be reported as a percentage.
D. Characteristics of Individual Respondents and Their Firms
Of the 324 respondents, 56% were male and 44% were female,58
which closely matches the proportion of male and female lawyers for the
whole of Queensland.59 As Table One shows, women are more likely to be
junior lawyers60 while men are more likely to hold senior positions,61 which
also reflects the general population of lawyers in Queensland and through-
out the common law world.62
56. Individual responses that could not be connected to a valid firm code were disregarded.
We also disregarded responses by individuals who were not full legal practitioners. That is, re-
sponses by non-legal staff, paralegal clerks, and trainee lawyers (in their first year of legal em-
ployment) were disregarded.
57. This was challenging because as a result of the need to keep firms anonymous, the LSC
did not collect data on the exact number of practicing certificate holders in each firm. Rather,
respondents only had to nominate the range in which they fell (5–9; 10–19; 20–49; >50). There-
fore, we took the lower number of the range for each firm and disregarded those responses where
we did not have at least half of the lowest number of practitioners in that firm.
58. Three respondents did not specify their gender.
59. Note that these proportions refer only to solicitors and not barristers (i.e., specialist advo-
cates). Queensland has a divided profession (solicitors and barristers), and only solicitors can
practice in law firms. Therefore, it is only relevant to compare the survey respondents with the
whole population of solicitors. The Queensland Law Society’s 2009–2010 Annual Report records
that 45% of practicing solicitors are female. QUEENSL. LAW SOC’Y, ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2010),
available at http://www.qls.com.au/content/lwp/wcm/resources/file/eb688c44e099ffb/2009-10-
qls-annual-report.pdf.
60. A “junior lawyer” is defined as not having achieved senior associateship, consultancy, or
partnership at the time of the Survey.
61. This distribution is statistically significant: Pearson Chi-square value 45.312, df = 8, p <
0.001.
62. For Australia, see generally Joanne Bagust, Work Practices and Culture in Major Austra-
lian Law Firms 268 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished PhD thesis, La Trobe University) (on file with
author); Francesca Bartlett, Professional Discipline Against Female Lawyers in Queensland, 17
GRIFFITH L. REV. 301, 306–07 (2008); Virginia Harrison, Women Slide in Partnership Ranks, THE
AUSTRALIAN, June 25, 2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/women-slide-
in-partnership-ranks/story-e6frg97x-1225884034943. For other jurisdictions, see generally Steve
French, Note, Of Problems, Pitfalls and Possibilities: A Comprehensive Look at Female Attorneys
and Law Firm Partnership, 21 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 189 (2000); Fiona Kay & Elizabeth
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TABLE ONE: RESPONDENTS’ ROLE IN FIRM, BY GENDER
Male Female Total
(n = 181) (n = 141) (n = 324)
Employee Lawyers (not Partners/Directors) 61% 93% 75%
First- to Third-Year Lawyer 28% 45% 36%
Fourth-Year+ Lawyer 13% 22% 17%
Senior Associate 11% 22% 16%
Consultant/Special Counsel 9% 4% 7%
Partner/Director 39% 7% 25%
Almost half (45%) of respondents had been practicing for less than
five years, and almost two-thirds (63%) had been practicing for less than
ten years (see Table Two).63 The distribution of respondents’ seniority va-
ried between firms. Some firms’ respondents were entirely comprised of
junior solicitors; for other firms, up to 50% of respondents were partners or
directors.
TABLE TWO: DURATION THAT RESPONDENTS HAD HELD A
PRACTICING CERTIFICATE
Male Female Total
(n = 181) (n = 141) (n = 324)
Less than 5 years 34% 60% 45%
5 to 9 years 16% 19% 17%
10 to 19 years 19% 17% 18%
20 to 29 years 24% 4% 15%
30+ years 7% 0% 4%
Sixteen (64%) of the twenty-five firms participating in the Survey
were partnerships (accounting for 76% of the individual lawyer respon-
dents). The remaining nine firms were incorporated legal practices.64 This
Gorman, Women in the Legal Profession, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 299 (2008). The fact that
partners and directors are predominantly male should be borne in mind where later analyses indi-
cate that seniority or gender affects responses. Generally it seems that seniority is more fundamen-
tal than gender in explaining lawyers’ perceptions of law firm management and ethical culture.
See Parker, Learning from Reflection, supra note 46, at 417.
63. This seems consistent with the general demographic that more than half of Queensland
solicitors are under 40 years of age. See QUEENSL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 59, at 12. Data on years
practicing is not available.
64. In Queensland and a number of other Australian states, legal practices are allowed to
incorporate under the ordinary corporations legislation. Firms that incorporate have additional
legal obligations to put in place internal ethical management systems. See Christine Parker, An
Opportunity for the Ethical Maturation of the Law Firm: The Ethical Implications of Incorporated
and Listed Law Firms, in REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS: TAKING STOCK AND NEW IDEAS 96–128
(Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010); Christine Parker, Tahlia Gordon & Steve Mark, Regulating Law
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is a slight overrepresentation of firms with seven or more practicing certifi-
cate holders that are incorporated legal practices compared with the larger
legal community.65
As shown in Table Three, 60% of the twenty-five firms (accounting
for 74% of the individual lawyer respondents) were located in Brisbane,
Queensland’s capital city, with the remainder in regional cities or towns.
This means that city lawyers are slightly overrepresented among our re-
spondents.66 Thirty-six percent of the firms (comprising 45% of the individ-
ual respondents) had multiple offices. Approximately half the respondents
worked at practices with more than twenty certified lawyers (see Table
Three). This is an overrepresentation of larger firms compared with the gen-
eral population of Queensland law firms.67 The gender composition of the
firms varied widely, between 23% and 91% male.68
Overall, available data show that the Survey respondents are broadly
representative of gender and seniority demographic trends in the Queen-
sland legal profession. They slightly over-represent city and incorporated
legal practice lawyers and strongly over-represent large firm lawyers, even
taking into account that only firms with more than seven practitioners were
invited to participate in the Survey. This was intended: the purpose of the
Survey was to encourage discussion and critical self-examination of cultural
and communication issues in relation to billing that are more relevant to
firms with more than a few practitioners, particularly medium to large
firms.
Regardless of the representativeness of the sample, the absolute sam-
ple size (twenty-five firms and 324 lawyers) is still a reasonable slice of the
170 law firms with more than seven practitioners in Queensland.69 It is
sufficient to provide some sense of the scale of any issues and is enough to
test the relationship between different factors. It is, however, important to
bear in mind that this group of twenty-five participating firms self-selected
Firm Ethics Management: An Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal
Profession in New South Wales, 37 J.L. & SOC’Y 466, 467 (2010).
65. Twenty percent of firms with seven or more practitioners are incorporated legal practices.
QUEENSL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 59, at 61. This overrepresentation is not surprising given that
such practices’ special regulatory arrangements probably give them a closer relationship with the
LSC, the entity conducting the survey.
66. About 64% of Queensland solicitors practice in the Brisbane central business district and
suburbs. Id. at 12.
67. LEGAL SERVS. COMM’N, 2009–2010 ANNUAL REPORT (Queensland) at 61. According to
the LSC’s figures, firms with seven or more practitioners only represent about 10% of all firms in
Queensland. Even among this group, firms with fifty or more practitioners only represent about
12% of firms in Queensland (compared with 34% participating in the survey), while firms with
less than twenty practitioners are underrepresented compared with the population of law firms.
68. No data are available on the gender profile of firms in Queensland generally to compare,
but we do know that 55% of lawyers in Queensland are male. QUEENSL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note
59, at 13.
69. It amounts to 15% of all 170 firms and a much larger proportion of firms with more than
twenty practitioners.
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TABLE THREE: INDIVIDUAL AND FIRM RESPONDENTS TO THE BILLING
PRACTICES SURVEY, BY NUMBER OF PRACTICING CERTIFICATE
(PC) HOLDERS IN FIRM AND LOCATION
Breakdown of Breakdown of Firms
Individual Respondents Participating in Survey
Brisbane Regional Brisbane RegionalTotal TotalCBD or City or CBD or City orIndividuals Firms
suburbs Town suburbs Town(n = 324) (n = 25)(n = 241) (n = 83) (n = 15) (n = 10)
5–9 PC 11% 29% 15% 27% 50% 36%holders
10–19
PC 30% 55% 36% 47% 40% 44%
holders
20–49
PC 15% 16% 15% 13% 10% 12%
holders
50+ PC 45% 0% 34% 13% 0% 8%holders
Total 60% 40% 100% 74% 26% 100%
to do the Survey in the first place. We might expect these firms to have the
greatest interest in ethical issues around billing and therefore the greatest
commitment to discussing and managing ethics in the firm. We therefore
expect this group to represent the best case for billing practices and ethics.
Any failure to accurately represent the objective truth of lawyers’ views
about ethical behavior will therefore tend to lie in an overestimation of law-
yers’ compliance with professional norms.
III. FIRM BILLING METHODS AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
We begin our analysis by considering several aspects of firm billing
practice that might put ethical pressure on lawyers: the billing methods law-
yers use—time-based billing or other methods; the level of billable hour
targets, if any; whether the number of hours billed is used as the main
means of measuring performance or whether more broad-based perform-
ance measures are used; and some other practices that might put particular
emphasis on the value of high billable hours, such as publishing a list com-
paring lawyers’ performance or giving bonuses to those who make higher
billings.
In each of the sections below, we look first at individual lawyers’ re-
sponses to the Survey. We then go on to aggregate individual responses to
the firm level to evaluate whether firms have different practices and ethical
cultures related to billing and what impact this has on individuals and their
billing practices.
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A. Billing Methods
As shown in Table Four, the great majority (91%) of individual re-
spondents indicated that their firm “always” or “mostly” used hourly bill-
ing.70 About a fifth (22%) report that they “always” or “mostly” perform
work for a fixed fee. Almost half (44%) indicated that their firm did work
on a no-win no-fee basis to some extent, but only 4% of respondents indi-
cated that their firm “always” provides services in this way.71 This means
that the scope of this study is not broad enough to consider whether
Kritzer’s view—that different fee arrangements influence the specific na-
ture of the unethical behavior, but not the likelihood of such behavior gen-
erally—is correct. Other arrangements sometimes used included fee
schedules (five respondents), assessment by independent costs assessors
(four respondents),72 and incentive fees.73
TABLE FOUR: INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR
FIRM’S BILLING METHODS
Always Mostly Sometimes Never
Time Based (Hourly) 25% 66% 9% 0%(n = 304)
Time Based (No-win No-fee) 4% 9% 31% 56%(n = 212)
Fixed Fee by Agreement 2% 21% 73% 5%(n = 243)
In eighteen of the twenty-five firms, 85% or more of individual re-
spondents reported that the firm “always” or “mostly” used time-based
(hourly) billing (in nine firms, 100% of lawyers chose this option). In only
two firms did 70% or more of respondents choose that the firm “always” or
“mostly” used fixed fee agreements. In the remainder of the firms, well
under half chose “sometimes” or “never.” There is therefore a fair degree of
agreement within each firm as to the dominant billing method used.
70. This means that there is not sufficient variation in our data to robustly test the effects of
various billing methods on ethical perceptions and behaviors.
71. Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 325 (Austl.) (prohibiting law firms from charging
contingency fees, which it defines as “a costs agreement under which the amount payable to the
law practice, or any part of that amount, is calculated by reference to the amount of any award or
settlement or the value of any property that may be recovered in any proceedings to which the
agreement relates”). Speculative litigation is therefore funded by litigation funders who pay law-
yers on an hourly rate, by fixed fee or on a no-win no-fee basis. For a discussion of litigation
funders in Australia, see Bernard Murphy & Camille Cameron, Access to Justice and the Evolu-
tion of Class Action Litigation in Australia, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 399, 434–39 (2006).
72. The basis of measurement for such assessments was unclear.
73. These other methods were each mentioned in comments in the open text box provided for
recording “other” billing methods.
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B. Billable Hour Targets
Of the 324 individual respondents, 86% indicated that they were given
a billable hour target. This proportion is lower than what has been reported
in the United States.74 In Australia, billable hour targets are generally set as
a daily figure rather than by year. Table Five sets out the distribution of
daily targets, broken down by gender. Table Six shows the breakdown by
partner versus other lawyers. The targets are generally around six billable
hours per day, which equates to 1,380 billable hours per year—less than
two-thirds of the targets set in very large firms in the United States before
the Global Economic Crisis.75 If this Survey suggests that respondents ex-
perience temptation to practice unethically with these fairly modest billable
hour targets, then big-firm American lawyers may well experience greater
temptation.
TABLE FIVE: INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS’ DAILY BILLABLE HOUR
TARGETS, BY GENDER
Male Female Total
(n = 180) (n = 141) (n = 323)
No daily target 16% 11% 13%
Fewer than six hours per day 32% 21% 27%
Six hours per day 14% 14% 14%
More than six hours per day 39% 55% 46%
A larger proportion of male than female lawyers had no daily target at
all. A much greater proportion of female solicitors than male solicitors were
required to bill more than six billable hours per day (see Table Five).76 The
difference in gender distribution is likely to reflect the greater number of
male solicitors who are partners or directors of the firm in which they work.
As partners and directors have obligations to expand their businesses and to
manage junior lawyers, they have lower billable hour targets or no targets
(as reflected in Table Six).77
Table Seven aggregates the individual lawyers’ reports of their daily
billable hour targets by firm. Individuals within firms were not unanimous
74. Ninety-six percent of law firm respondents answering an on-line survey created by the
ABA Commission on Billable Hours indicated that they have a minimum hour requirement. See
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at 43 (stating that twenty-two of 570 law firms responding
did not have a minimum hour requirement).
75. A series of studies studying the billable hour targets for American lawyers are set out in
Schiltz, supra note 11, at 891–92, and Richmond, supra note 5, at 88.
76. Chi-square tests confirmed that the association was statistically significant. p = 0.04,
Pearson Chi-square value = 8.095, df = 1.
77. This difference is statistically significant: Pearson Chi-square: p = 0.01. Value = 21.353,
df = 5. It is also consistent with previous findings. For example, Fortney found that the mean
annual billable expectation for managing associates was 1,861 hours, while the mean for super-
vised attorneys was 1,887. Fortney, Billable Hours, supra note 26, at 175–76.
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TABLE SIX: INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS’ DAILY BILLABLE HOUR
TARGETS, BY ROLE
OtherPartner Totallawyers(n = 80) (n = 323)(n = 243)
No daily target 18% 12% 13%
Less than six hours per day 39% 23% 27%
Six hours per day 15% 13% 14%
More than six hours per day 29% 53% 46%
about the level of daily billable hour targets, although the majority tended to
clump together. That is, individuals reported a variety of targets even within
the same firm. But visual inspection of results showed that in most firms the
individual responses tended to clump together towards the low, moderate,
or high end of the scale.
TABLE SEVEN: LEVEL OF FIRM’S OVERALL DAILY BILLABLE
HOUR TARGETS78
Percentage of
firms (n = 25)
No daily target 16%
Fewer than six hours per day 40%
Six hours per day 16%
More than six hours per day 28%
C. Billable Hours as a Measure of Performance
For each of a series of potential performance measures (e.g., amount
billed, client satisfaction, etc.), respondents were asked whether the firm
“always,” “mostly,” “sometimes,” or “never” took the issue into account.
Table Eight displays the proportion of respondents who agreed that their
firm “always” or “mostly” took the issue into account (shown in order from
matters most to least commonly considered).
Survey results showed that partners are consistently more sanguine
about the diversity and substance of matters relevant to a fee earner’s per-
formance than other lawyers. Employed lawyers are much more likely to
believe that performance measurement and management is solely deter-
mined by the amount earned, while partners see performance assessment as
based on a range of factors including the amount earned, competence, effi-
78. The coding of firms’ overall billable hour targets (i.e., none, less than six hours, six
hours, or more than six hours) was achieved by visual inspection of the data to observe where the
majority of individual responses within each firm fell.
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TABLE EIGHT: INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS’ PERCEPTION OF FACTORS
“ALWAYS” OR “MOSTLY” USED TO MEASURE AND MANAGE
PERFORMANCE, BY ROLE
Other TotalPartners Lawyers (n = 324)
Amount fee earner has billed 84% 79%† 80%
Client satisfaction 77% 61%‡ 65%
Efficiency of fee earner’s work 72% 62%† 65%
Fee earner’s diligence and competence 69% 60%‡ 62%
Accuracy of fee earner’s costs estimates 54% 42%‡ 45%
Amount of supervisory work undertaken 58% 38%‡ 43%
Fee earner’s maintenance of updated costs 51% 38%‡ 41%
estimates
Fee earner’s ethical reputation 61% 33%‡ 40%
Number of pro bono hours worked 48% 21%‡ 28%
† Indicates difference in distribution in responses between partners and other
lawyers is significant to p = 0.05 or less.
‡ Indicates difference in distribution in responses between partners and other
lawyers is significant to p = 0.001 or less.
ciency, and ethics.79 Strikingly, the proportion of partners who consider that
a lawyer’s ethical reputation is always or mostly relevant to her compensa-
tion is almost twice as high as the proportion of other lawyers holding the
same view (60% of partners versus 33% of employed lawyers). This means
that among partners it is the fifth most commonly chosen item that is rele-
vant to assessing lawyers’ performance. By contrast, it is number eight
among other lawyers, only ahead of “number of pro bono hours.”
These responses are consistent with Fortney’s findings that while 83%
of supervised attorneys indicated that bonuses were largely based on billa-
ble hours production, only 67% of managing attorneys agreed.80 Fortney
noted that this difference might arise because the populations of managing
attorneys and supervised attorneys responding to her survey were drawn
from different firms, because attorneys’ perceptions about bonuses differ
within the same firm, or because managing attorneys declined to acknowl-
edge the significant role that hours play in bonus determinations.81
79. Looking more closely at the amount that the fee earner has billed, 71% of employed
lawyers, compared with 65% of partners, considered this to be “always” relevant to the measure-
ment and management of his or her performance. Of the measures identified, “amount earned” is
the only one that a higher proportion of employed lawyers than partners consider to be “always”
relevant. (Not shown in Table Eight.)
80. Fortney, Billable Hours, supra note 26, at 176–77.
81. Id. at 177.
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As mentioned above, great care has been taken to ensure that the popu-
lations of junior and senior lawyers in this study are from the same set of
twenty-five firms. Therefore, it seems likely that senior and junior lawyers
within the same firm have quite different perceptions about the variety and
substance of matters taken into account in assessing lawyers’ performance.
While junior lawyers feel as if their performance is measured largely on a
single dimension, management sees performance measurement as multi-
stranded.
D. Bonuses for Exceeding Billable Hour Targets and Billable Hours
Rankings
Firms use two other performance assessment approaches that can in-
crease competition between lawyers: the circulation of lists that rank fee
earners’ performance and awarding bonuses when lawyers exceed billing
targets. Thirty-nine percent (126 of 324) of respondents reported that their
firm had adopted a policy to reward fee earners who exceeded their budget
of billable hours.82 Thirty percent of respondents (ninety-five of 316) re-
ported that their firm published a list that ranked fee earners’ performance.
Only 3% of these respondents (three of ninety-five) reported that their firm
made the list anonymous.
Aggregating to the firm level, the clear majority of lawyers in six of
the firms said their firm published a ranking list of fee earners’ performance
by name, while a majority of lawyers in the other nineteen firms indicated
that their firms did not.83 There was much less unanimity around whether
bonuses were available for exceeding billable hours. In nineteen firms, 60%
or more of lawyers indicated that their firm did give bonuses to lawyers
exceeding the target, and in fifteen firms fewer than half of the lawyers
indicated that such bonuses existed.
Unanimous agreement that the bonuses existed occurred in only two
firms and such agreement that the bonuses did not exist occurred in only
three firms. It seems that while most people in a firm know whether or not a
list ranking fee earners’ performance is published, knowledge of bonuses
for exceeding billing targets is much less consistent. Perhaps lawyers only
know for sure how their own bonuses, if they receive one, are calculated.
Thus, knowledge of bonuses for exceeding billable hours targets could be a
matter of rumor and jealousy rather than transparency.
82. This comprised 43% of male respondents and 36% of female respondents. The difference
was not quite statistically significant. Pearson Chi-square = 5.52; p = 0.062.
83. As with the previous table, the coding of firms as to whether they publish a list is based
on visual inspection of what individual respondents in that firm said. The result in each case was
unanimous or close to unanimous.
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IV. BILLABLE HOURS AND ETHICAL PRESSURES AND CONCERNS
In this part, we examine respondents’ experiences of unethical prac-
tices and their perception of ethical pressure within the firm at which they
work. The important question is whether there is a link between the billing
practices in lawyers’ firms and either their observation of unethical prac-
tices or their perception of ethical pressure. We analyze our data to deter-
mine whether such a link exists at both the individual and firm level.
Finally, we report on respondents’ reactions to two hypothetical scena-
rios—one involving bill padding and the other involving time billing—in
order to flesh out these issues.
A. Ethical Concerns
Respondents were asked whether they had ever had “concerns” about
or actually observed incidents of bill padding and, if they had, what they
had done about it. A summary of the responses is shown in Table Nine. By
asking questions regarding both concerns about and actual observed in-
stances of bill padding, we can see the degree to which lawyers’ suspicions
run ahead of hard evidence.
Thirty-four percent of respondents reported concerns about the billing
practices of other legal practitioners in their firm, and 23% reported having
observed one or more instances of “padding” bills for work not actually
performed (although only 2% reported that padding occurred regularly).84
As an overall figure, this is a sizeable proportion of the respondents.85
There does, however, seem to be a substantial difference between indi-
viduals’ experiences in different firms. In eleven of the twenty-five firms,
more than half of the lawyer-respondents reported having concerns about
the billing practices of others within the firm.86 In these firms, perceptions
that unethical billing practices were possibly used appear to be rife. In a
further five firms, more than 20% of the lawyers reported concerns about
others’ billing practices. There were only two firms where no lawyers re-
ported having concerns about the billing practices of others in the firm.
In eleven of the twenty-five firms, more than 20% of the lawyers re-
ported that they had actually observed instances of bill padding.87 In five
84. There were no statistically significant differences by gender or by partner versus other
lawyers in the responses to these questions in our data. Although a higher proportion of partners
reported such concerns about billing practices (38.3%) than other lawyers (32.6%), fewer partners
reported having observed instances of bill padding (69.1%) than other lawyers (79.7%).
85. See also Ross, Ethics of Hourly Billing, supra note 2, app. A at 93 (finding that 12.3% of
private lawyers responded that lawyers “frequently” pad their hours and 38% of private lawyers
responded that lawyers “occasionally” pad their hours).
86. The highest instance of concerns about billing practices occurred in one firm where
three-quarters of the lawyers said they had concerns about the billing practices of others in the
firm.
87. These were the same firms where more than half of the lawyers had concerns about
others’ billing practices.
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TABLE NINE: PROPORTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS WITH ETHICAL
CONCERNS ABOUT BILLING
Proportion of Lawyers with Concerns
Have you ever had concerns about
the billing practices of other legal 34%practitioners/staff in your firm?
(n = 317)
During your employment at the 23%firm have you ever observed any Regularly – 2%instances of “padding” bills for Occasionally – 16%
work not actually performed? Once – 6%(n = 318)
such firms, more than 40% of the lawyers said they had observed bill pad-
ding. In no firm, however, had more than half of the lawyers observed bill
padding.
Thus, while it is likely that there will be at least one lawyer with ethi-
cal concerns in every firm, there are some firms where such concerns are
shared by significant parts of the workforce. The responses also indicate a
discrepancy between people’s suspicions and their knowledge of specific,
actual evidence. In such firms, the fact that actual evidence is limited may
not be sufficient to counter rumor and suspicion, which may encourage eth-
ical apathy.
Those lawyers reporting ethical concerns about billing or who had ob-
served bill padding were asked how they had handled those concerns.
Seven percent of those who answered this question reported doing noth-
ing.88 Fourteen percent reported discussing the matter with their supervisor,
11% reported discussing the matter with another legal practitioner, and 9%
discussed the matter with the legal practitioner in question. Other responses
mentioned in open-text comments included having the matter dealt with by
the managing partner (two instances) or the partners generally (three in-
stances), writing off the time without taking further action (three instances),
and dealing with the conduct as a training issue (four instances). As one
respondent said,
These were not cases of bills which had been rendered to
clients, but instances of draft bills prepared by junior practitioners
who have not had exposure to the taxation of costs regime. In
these cases, I discussed with the practitioners what were and were
not appropriate charges to be made.
Most respondents’ open-text comments agreed that bill padding is ethi-
cally problematic, although some respondents expressed frustration at being
compared to those fee earners who are considered corrupt. For example,
88. One hundred-twenty respondents answered this question—37% of the total 324 respon-
dents—showing that the 34% and 23% in Table Nine are not completely overlapping groups.
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Padding goes on throughout the firm and it is like an unwin-
nable war. I regularly get into trouble because I am not one of the
big billers of the firm, even though my work is always done and
my clients are happy. I refuse to pad my time sheet and I left a
previous employer where time sheet padding was blatant and
rife. . . . Where the only way you ever get ahead is by making the
firm lots of money, the pressure to pad time sheets will always be
there.
On the other hand, some responses indicated skepticism about whether
double charging is always ethically questionable. Especially where their
work related to the production and use of template documents, respondents
appeared to believe they were entitled to recoup the time and effort spent on
the template by charging more than strict time-based billing would allow:89
In certain cases ‘padding’ is very much warranted as time
charging can at times devalue the true work that goes into a mat-
ter, from researching at home to using precedents developed over
years of practice and experience. There are times where if you do
not “pad” a bill you are effectively devaluing your work. The key
is to be fair and reasonable about it, in which case it’s not some-
thing which ought to raise any concerns.
These respondents did not appear to consider whether they should al-
ready have factored these costs into their hourly rates, or whether—if they
were to adopt a value-billing approach—they and their clients would be
better served by a fixed-fee arrangement. Finally, no respondent gave any
indication that, if the value of their work to the client is the most important
issue in determining the appropriate amount to bill, they had ever decreased
the amount of otherwise efficient work for which they had billed a client.
B. Ethical Pressure
Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with a series of
statements about the nature of time billing generally and their experiences
of legal practice at their firm. The statements and the average responses are
set out in Table Ten. Taken as a whole, respondents were generally ambiva-
lent about the benefits and the hazards of time billing. In particular, few
respondents agreed that time billing is the only valid way to measure fee
earners’ performance (mean response of 2.2 on a scale from 1 to 5,
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”). They were less dismissive, how-
ever, of the proposition that time billing was the only accurate way to assess
and reward the effort that fee earners put in (mean response of 2.7), and
89. See also Steve Mark, The Cost of Justice or Justice in Costs—The Experience of the
OLSC in Handling Costs Complaints, 27 U.N.S.W. L.J. 225, 229–30 (2004) (discussing the nego-
tiating process necessary for “value billing” to be effective); Webb, supra note 18, at 41–42
(discussing the ethical pros and cons of value billing).
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even less dismissive of the proposition that time billing is the only realistic
way to bill for most legal work (mean response of 3.1).
There is a significant difference between partners and other lawyers on
a number of statements related to the sense of ethical pressure that time
billing creates in lawyers’ minds. These are noted in Table Ten.90 Partners’
responses to the statements were marked by the same comparative opti-
mism as their views about the matters relevant to performance assessment.
They were significantly less likely than employed lawyers to agree that time
billing creates greater competition, corner cutting, excessive duplication of
effort, and so on. The strongest difference regards the statement that time
billing adversely affects the quality of mentoring, with partners much less
likely to believe this is so than employed lawyers. Particularly relevant for
the purposes of this study is the statement, “It feels as if there is pressure to
bill from the management of the practice.” While even the majority of part-
ners agreed with this statement, they expressed a lower level of agreement
than other lawyers.91
There are also large differences between firms in the average response
of their lawyers to this question. The average response was 4.0 or above in
seven firms, indicating that the vast majority of lawyers agreed or strongly
agreed that they felt pressure to bill. There was only one firm with an aver-
age response to this question under 3.0, indicating that those lawyers mostly
did not feel pressure to bill. In all other firms, the balance of lawyers’ opin-
ions was that they felt pressure to bill.
Respondents’ opinions of time billing varied according to whether they
had a daily billable hour target or not. Those with no daily billable hour
target were significantly less likely to report feeling pressure to bill.92 Per-
haps unsurprisingly, they are also significantly less likely to think that time
is the only realistic way to bill for most legal work.93 In fact, they are sig-
nificantly more likely to think that time billing discourages project or case
planning than those who have a target.94
C. Relationship Between Firm Billing Practices and Ethical Pressures
and Concerns: Individuals
Do lawyers who feel that time-based billing is more important for their
firms or who feel that billable hours dominate their performance assess-
ment95 also have greater concerns about the ethical practices in their firm
90. These were calculated using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) between groups. Full statis-
tics are available from the first author upon request.
91. The mean for partners is 3.5 and for other lawyers is 3.8. The difference in variation
between the two groups is statistically significant. Between groups ANOVA F = 6.2; p = 0.01.
92. Mean of 3.1 compared with 3.8. Significance tested using ANOVA. F = 9.983; p = .000.
93. Mean of 2.7 compared with 3.2. ANOVA: F = 5; p = .007.
94. Mean of 3.2 compared with 2.8. ANOVA: F = 4.2; p = .016.
95. See discussion supra Section III.
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TABLE TEN: INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS’ SENSE OF SUPPORT OF AND PRESSURE
FROM TIME BILLING (N = 316)
Mean




Other (standardPartners Lawyers deviation(n = 237) (n = 80) shown in
brackets)
(n = 316)
Statements Supportive of Time Billing
Time billing is the most realistic way to 3.0 3.2 3.1 (1.2)bill for most legal work.
Time billing is the only accurate way to
give lawyers fair remuneration for the 2.8 2.6 2.7 (1.1)
work they put in.
Time billing is the only valid way to 2.4 2.1 2.2 (1.0)
measure a fee earner’s performance.
Statements About Ethical Pressures
Arising from Time Billing
It feels as if there is pressure to bill 3.5 3.8† 3.7 (1.1)from the management of the practice.
Time billing results in lawyers
competing against each other within the 3.0 3.6‡ 3.4 (1.1)
practice.
Time billing fails to discourage 3.1 3.4† 3.3 (1.0)
excessive duplication of effort.
Time billing adversely effects the 2.6 3.3‡ 3.1 (1.2)quality of mentoring.
Time billing encourages cutting corners 2.6 3.1† 2.9 (1.1)
when there is pressure to meet a budget.
Time billing does not encourage project 2.7 2.9 2.9 (1.1)
or case planning.
† Indicates there is a difference in responses between partners and other lawyers
that is significant to p = 0.05 or less.
‡ Indicates there is a difference in responses between partners and other lawyers
that is significant to p = 0.001 or less.
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and feel under greater ethical pressure themselves? If so, this might be be-
cause they feel that the firm values maximization of billable hours to the
exclusion of ethical concerns.96
Table Eleven shows the differences in perceptions of ethical pressure
for lawyers who have a daily billable hours target compared with lawyers
who do not. As might be expected, there is a dramatic difference in whether
they feel “pressure to bill from the management of the practice”: 74% of
those who have daily targets feel pressure compared with 35% of those who
do not.97 Having a billable hour target also influences, albeit to a lesser
degree, whether lawyers had observed any instances of padding bills for
work not actually performed and whether they had concerns about the bill-
ing practices of others in their firms.98
Table Twelve shows a similar analysis, this time between those law-
yers who report that they work in a firm that publishes a ranking list of fee
earners and those who do not. Lawyers in firms with ranking lists are more
likely to feel pressure to bill.99 The difference is not as dramatic as that,
however, between those who have daily billable hour targets and those who
do not. Similarly, lawyers in firms where rankings occur are also more
likely to have observed instances of padding and had concerns about the
billing practices of others in their firm compared with lawyers in firms that
did not rank fee earners.100
D. Relationship Between Firm Billing Practices and Ethical Pressures
and Concerns: Firms
The above section considers the relationship between perceptions of
billing practices and ethical outcomes at the individual level, but it is
equally important to consider this relationship at the level of the whole firm
and how it impacts individuals. We would expect that if billable hours are
the source of ethical concerns, then those firms where lawyers report higher
billable hours and greater use of them in performance assessment would
also be firms in which lawyers have more ethical concerns and feel greater
pressure to bill. Therefore, we tested whether there is any statistical associa-
96.  See discussion supra Section IV.A–B.
97. The statistical significance could not be tested because of the relatively low number of
respondents who have no daily billable hour targets—still, the difference is so large it is clear that
it is important.
98. Twenty-four percent of those with a target had observed padding, compared with only
9% who did not have a target. Thirty-six percent of those with a target had concerns, compared
with 19% of those who did not have a target. Statistical significance could not be tested. See supra
note 97.
99. Seventy-eight percent of ranked lawyers feel under pressure to bill compared with 64%
of non-ranked lawyers.
100. Again, parameters for tests of significant difference were not met and therefore they
cannot be calculated.
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TABLE ELEVEN: ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN WHETHER LAWYERS HAVE A
DAILY BILLABLE HOUR TARGET AND ETHICAL
PRESSURES AND CONCERNS
No dailyProportion of lawyers who report that they Daily billable billabledo/do not have a daily billable hour hour target hour targettarget . . . (n = 272) (n = 43)
. . . who strongly agree/agree with statement “It
feels as if there is pressure to bill from the 74% 35%
management of the practice.”
. . . who have observed any instances of 24% 9%padding.
. . . who have ever had concerns about the
billing practices of other legal practitioners/staff 36% 19%
in their firm.
TABLE TWELVE: ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN WHETHER FIRM PUBLISHES A
RANKING LIST OF FEE EARNERS AND ETHICAL
PRESSURES AND CONCERNS
Firm does Firm does
Proportion of lawyers who report that their firm publish a not publish
does/does not publish a ranking list . . . ranking a ranking
(n = 95) (n = 222)
. . . who strongly agree/agree with statement “It
feels as if there is pressure to bill from the 78% 64%
management of the practice.”
. . . who have observed any instances of padding. 30% 20%
. . . who have ever had concerns about the billing
practices of other legal practitioners/staff in their 39% 32%
firm.
tion between various billing practices and ethical pressures and concerns at
the firm level.
We did not find any significant correlation between the percentage of
lawyers in the firm reporting that their firm always or mostly uses time-
based billing and the level of ethical pressures and concerns lawyers in
those firms felt.101 Nor did the use of set billable hour targets,102 the award-
101. There were not enough firms in the study where it was clear they always or mostly used
fixed fees by agreement to do a similar statistic. ANOVA was used to check for correlations. Full
statistics are available from the first author. There was also no correlation dividing the firms into
those in which a majority of lawyers reported time-based billing was used and those in which a
majority said it was not used.
102. In firms without a billable hours target, 25% of lawyers indicated concerns about other
lawyers’ billing practices, 10% reported having observed bill padding, and the mean response
when questioned about feeling pressure to bill was 3.4. In firms with a billable hours target, 39%
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ing of bonuses for exceeding targets,103 or the circulation of lists ranking
billing performance104 make a difference to firm lawyers’ overall percep-
tions of ethical pressures and concerns. Thus, we find no evidence that
firms’ use of billable hours directly leads to higher ethical concerns and
pressures.
There is, however, a series of correlations between solicitors perceiv-
ing pressure from management to bill, solicitors having concerns about the
billing practices of other fee earners in their firm, and solicitors observing
instances of bill padding for work not performed (see Table Thirteen).
Firms with more solicitors who have concerns about billing practices also
have more solicitors who agree that there is pressure to bill and that they
have observed bill padding. On a firm-wide basis, however, a higher aver-
age sense of pressure to bill among the lawyers does not correlate with
observed instances of bill padding. In some firms, then, there is a shared
perception of pressure to bill associated with concerns about billing prac-
tices—but this does not mean that lawyers have in fact observed unethical
practice. Nor does it relate directly to the fact that those firms formally use
billable hours in particular ways. Rather, it is a matter of perception and
perhaps rumor and suspicion among lawyers in those firms.
E. Hypothetical Scenarios
A more in-depth way to understand how billing pressures affect law-
yers’ day-to-day practices is through their responses to a series of realistic
hypothetical scenarios that were included in the Survey.105
The first scenario is as follows:
A client retains a firm on the basis that they will be charged on an
hourly rate. Partner A provides a client with an estimate of work
for $10,000.00. At the conclusion of the matter, the account
comes to $5,000.00 on a time costing basis. Partner A charges the
client $9,000.00 as the work performed by the firm was, in his
view, of a high quality and the outcome exceptional.
of lawyers indicated concerns about other lawyers’ billing practices, 22% reported having ob-
served bill padding, and the mean response when questioned about feeling pressure to bill was 3.7.
Although figures suggesting ethical problems are uniformly higher for firms with billable hours
targets, none of the comparisons were statistically significant or approached significance. There
was also no significant association between firms with respondents reporting higher billable hours
and firms with respondents reporting lower billable hours.
103. As mentioned previously, the lawyers in each firm are not even unanimous about whether
their firm offers such bonuses or not. It is not possible to reliably divide the firms into those that
offer such a bonus and those that do not. Therefore the statistic has been calculated only using the
proportion of lawyers in each firm who have reported that the firm has such a bonus.
104. Because lawyers were fairly unanimous about whether their firms published a ranking list
or not, it was possible to divide the firms into those that did publish a ranking list and those that
did not (on the basis of what the vast majority of lawyers in each firm reported). On this basis six
firms did publish a ranking list and nineteen firms did not.
105. There were five scenarios included in the Survey. We briefly discuss two here.
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TABLE THIRTEEN: SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN THE
THREE ETHICAL OUTCOMES
Proportion of Proportion oflawyers in firm lawyers in firm
who strongly Proportion of
who have ever
agree/agree lawyers in had concerns
with statement firm who
about the
“It feels as if have observed billing practicesthere is any instances
of other legalpressure to bill of bill practitioners/from the padding
staff in their
management of firmthe practice.”
Proportion of lawyers in
firm who strongly agree/ Not Significantly
agree with statement “It N/A significantly and positivelyfeels as if there is pressure
associated associatedto bill from the management
of the practice.”
Proportion of lawyers in Not Significantly
firm who have observed any significantly N/A and positively
instances of bill padding associated associated
Proportion of lawyers in
firm who have ever had Significantly Significantly
concerns about the billing
and positively and positively N/Apractices of other legal
associated associatedpractitioners/staff in their
firm
Roughly three-quarters of respondents stated that the billing practice
was not ethically appropriate and that the culture in their firm did not en-
courage the practice (see Table Fourteen). There was no difference between
partners’ and other lawyers’ views about the ethical propriety of the hypo-
thetical scenario. Partners, however, were slightly more optimistic than
other lawyers that the culture of their firm discouraged the practice.
In open-text comments, twenty-seven people stated that they re-
sponded “maybe” because they did not know the answer; a further eight
expressly indicated that they were unsure of the ethical acceptability of the
billing practice because they did not know the firm policy. This result is
consistent with Fortney’s survey, in which one-quarter of respondents did
not know about the relevant billing guidelines—which Fortney noted was
the same as having no guidance at all.106 Other open-text comments dis-
puted whether charging the $9,000 really was unethical on the basis that it
might reflect the value of the work.107 But, as some recognized, the prob-
106. Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 2, at 253.
107. One respondent commented:
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TABLE FOURTEEN: RESPONSES TO FIRST HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO
Partners Others
(n = 81) (n = 237)
Yes No Maybe Yes No Maybe
Billing practice is ethically 7% 78% 15% 10% 75% 15%
appropriate (n = 318)
Culture in firm encourages this 7% 80% 12% 14% 75% 12%practice (n = 317)
lem is that it may not have been agreed upon with the client before the bill
was rendered.108
The second scenario was as follows:
You are taking a two hour plane trip from Brisbane to Melbourne
to conduct an interview in a matter involving client A. While on
the plane, you review materials for another file you are working
on for client B for the following week. Your firm has a billing
procedure whereby you normally bill clients for your time spent
traveling/waiting on their behalf.
Respondents were asked whether they would bill both client A and
client B for two hours and whether the culture in their firm encouraged the
practice. Again, around three-quarters of respondents stated that it would be
ethically inappropriate to bill both clients and that the culture in their firm
did not encourage the practice (see Table Fifteen). Partners were again more
optimistic than employee-lawyers in their belief that the culture of the firm
discouraged the practice, and again, twenty-five of forty-three respondents
who responded “maybe” and provided additional comments indicated that
they were unaware of a firm policy on the appropriate charging practices.109
I answered ‘maybe’ because the client thought they would be charged at an hourly rate,
which they obviously have not been given the premium bill. However, if the work was
worth $10,000 as quoted (and I understand that is subjective) and the client agreed to
that quote, I do not think there is an ethical issue in charging the client $9k. The problem
arises, as I said, with the fact that the client thought they would be charged at an hourly
rate for work done.
Another commented:
Lawyers fall victim to undercharging for their IP. Some matters should be ‘value’ billed
rather than time billed, particularly if the lawyer involved is particularly efficient and
the general estimate is more than the time incurred. Also, with long term clients it is a
matter of ‘swings and roundabouts’ where there are substantial write offs on other mat-
ters or work provided without time being charged to the file.
108. One respondent comments:
A contract is binding and so if the fee agreement (contract) does not allow for a per-
formance uplift over and above physical time spent then billing more than the contrac-
tual amount is wrong (i.e. time spent is the determinant of the appropriate fee). If
however the fee agreement allows for an uplift over and above time and the client is
happy to pay the premium for the job well done then you would be mad not to charge
the higher fee.
109. As shown in Table Fifteen, junior lawyers were a little more likely to have answered
“maybe” than partners.
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TABLE FIFTEEN: RESPONSES TO SECOND HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO
Partners Others
(n = 81) (n = 236)
Yes No Maybe Yes No Maybe
Bill both client A and client B 4% 93% 4% 14% 77% 9%
Culture in firm encourages this 7% 90% 3% 14% 67% 19%practice
V. FIRM ETHICS POLICIES AND THEIR EFFECTS
Finally, we consider whether lawyers are aware of systems their firms
have in place aimed at preventing ethical misconduct related to billing and
whether these have any effect on ethical pressures and concerns.
A. Firm Ethics Policies and Ethical Pressures and Concerns: Individual
Lawyers
Some firms put measures in place to educate lawyers about their ethi-
cal obligations related to billing and to uncover and punish unethical billing
practices. Table Sixteen shows the responses to a question asking whether
respondents’ firms had policies and/or procedures in place specifically for
ensuring ethical practices in relation to billing.110 The vast majority of law-
yers reported that reactive monitoring practices were in place: measures to
deal with complaints and concerns clients and employees raise. Far fewer
respondents reported that their firms utilized more proactive measures. A
smaller majority reported policies or procedures to “monitor” or “review”
billing practices, and lower proportions of lawyers reported that their firms
had specific measures in place to review all accounts and time sheets regu-
larly. Partners tended to be more aware of policies and procedures for moni-
toring billing practices than junior lawyers were.111 There is one exception:
employed solicitors are more aware that their billing practices are directly
reviewed.112
Similarly, in a separate question, respondents were asked whether their
firms audited fee earners’ billing practices before the firm paid bonuses:
110. There were also a number of further, even more specific, questions about policies and
procedures in relation to billing practices in the firms that are not reported here. Full results of the
survey are available at Queensl. Legal Servs. Comm’n, Ethics Checks for Law Firms – the Survey
Results, LEGAL SERVS. COMM’N (2011), http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/554.htm (last accessed Oct. 11,
2011).
111. The difference is statistically significant for all items: Pearson Chi-square: p = .000 for
all items. The results also differ significantly by gender, but we expect that the explanation for this
difference is the difference in seniority in the firm. Therefore, we only show the breakdown by
seniority.
112. This difference confirms previous research on differences between partners and other
lawyers in relation to workplace culture policies. See Parker, Learning from Reflection, supra note
46.
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TABLE SIXTEEN: INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS’ AWARENESS THAT THEIR FIRM
HAS ETHICS POLICIES FOR BILLING, BY ROLE
Does your firm have a policy and/or Partner Other lawyers Totalprocedure in place for:
Dealing with clients’ account 98% 79% 83%
complaints
Dealing with employees’ concerns 82% 66% 70%
about an account
Dealing with ethical concerns or 78% 64% 68%queries about billing
Supervisors reviewing all solicitors’ 65% 68% 67%
accounts every month
Monitoring billing practices 78% 59% 64%
Reviewing all accounts rendered by 64% 60% 61%the practice
Reviewing billing practices 70% 52% 57%
Reviewing all solicitors’ timesheets 55% 58% 57%
regularly
Detecting improper billing practices 69% 45% 51%
Reporting improper billing practices 25% 32% 30%to Legal Services Commissioner
only 18% responded affirmatively.113 There was a large difference between
partners and employed lawyers: 41% of partners said their firms audited a
fee earner’s billing practices before paying a bonus compared to only 10%
of employed lawyers. The vast majority of employed lawyers (75%) did not
know whether auditing occurred, while only 13% of partners said they did
not know.114
Policies and procedures specifically related to billing practices are not
the only measures that might be important in controlling unethical billing:
more general systems and procedures for ethics training and discussion
might also have an effect. Table Seventeen, therefore, shows results to a
question that asked whether various avenues for ethical awareness and rais-
ing ethical concerns were available in the firm. In no case did more than
half the respondents report that their firm had employed the measure. The
highest responses were for ethics training, which 44% of respondents stated
took place in their firms. Partners are more likely to report that their firms
have a designated ethics partner or solicitor than employed lawyers (46%
compared with 35%) are and that their firms schedule in-house meetings to
113. Twenty-three percent reported that their firm did not audit billing practices, and 59% did
not know either way. Three hundred and nineteen respondents answered the question.
114. The difference is obviously statistically significant. Pearson Chi-square: p = .000.
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address ethical concerns and queries (41% of partners compared with 27%
of employed lawyers).115
TABLE SEVENTEEN: INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS’ AWARENESS THAT FIRM HAS
GENERAL ETHICS POLICIES
Percentage ofDoes your firm have any of the following to address lawyers answering
ethical concerns or queries of employees? yes
Designated ethics partner/solicitor 38%
Ethics committee 24%
Written policy of encouraging reporting of misconduct 26%
Scheduled in-firm meetings 31%
Scheduled training on ethics issues 44%
In their optional open-text responses to this question, a number of law-
yers commented that their firm had an informal culture of dealing with ethi-
cal concerns, generally by discussing concerns with a partner.
Two of our partners deal with ethical issues. We have a culture of
raising problems as they arise (without blame) and then designate
a partner to resolve the issue. Our Monday meetings are used to
reinforce ethical and other queries of that nature and are openly
discussed with all present.
I’m not sure if we have a formal “policy.” The partners have
an open door policy about pretty much everything, including em-
ployees’ concerns about ethics, relating to billing or otherwise. If
any employee, whether it be a solicitor or support staff member,
was unsure about the amount of an account, they are always en-
couraged to talk to the supervising solicitor or one of the partners
to put their concerns forward and resolve the issue.
A number also mentioned encouraging use of the professional associa-
tion, the Law Society of Queensland, to answer ethical queries: “The staff
are encouraged to approach a partner with ethical concerns and they don’t
know if the partners approach the Law Society.” Some lawyers, however,
did mention more specific and proactive firm procedures or policies to en-
sure ventilation and resolution of ethical concerns, such as regular emails
requesting issues be identified with supervising partners and escalated as
necessary and practice-support lawyers in the firm conducting regular file
audits.
The question most critical to our inquiry is whether firm ethics policies
actually alleviate lawyers’ perceptions that they are under ethical pressure
related to billing and reduce actual unethical practices. Statistical testing
showed no relationship between individual lawyers reporting that their
115. Parameters for testing statistical significance do not apply.
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firms have policies in place to encourage ethical billing practices and
whether they felt under more or less pressure to bill.116 There is, however, a
statistical relationship between firm policies to ensure ethical billing and
lawyers reporting both fewer observed instances of bill padding and a lower
level of ethical concerns about the billing practices of other lawyers within
their firms (see Tables Eighteen and Nineteen).117 Thus, monitoring did not
reduce lawyers’ perceptions that management pressured them to bill, but it
did ease perceptions that their colleagues were engaging in bill padding.
TABLE EIGHTEEN: OBSERVED PADDING, BY EXISTENCE OF POLICIES





Firm has a policy in Yes (n = 161) 19% 81%
place to detect improper No (n = 46) 45% 55%
billing practices? Don’t know (n = 108) 20% 79%
Total (n = 315) 23% 77%
B. Firm Ethics Policies, Ethical Pressures, and Concerns: Firms
Ethics policies and procedures are intended to ensure consistent per-
ceptions and practices throughout the whole firm, yet respondents from the
same firm often answered these questions differently. In many firms there
was no clear majority as to whether a particular ethics policy or procedure
was in place.118 In most cases, it is unlikely that ethics policies or proce-
dures would exist in only part of the firm. Therefore, these results suggest
116. That is, there is no statistical correlation between any of the items shown in Table Sixteen
and our measure of whether lawyers feel under pressure to bill.
117. The difference is statistically significant. Pearson Chi-square = 16.539; p = 0.002. (There
were similar, but generally weaker, relationships between most of the other items shown in Table
Sixteen and either ethical concerns or observed instances of bill padding or both. Statistics are
available from the first author upon request. Similar tests of the association between lawyers
reporting the existence of general ethics policies in their firms (the items shown in Table Seven-
teen) and the three ethical outcomes did not identify any clear relationship. These statistics are
also available from the first author upon request.
118. If we consider a clear majority to be either 25% or less or 75% or more reporting the
same way, then respondents from eighteen of the twenty-five firms could not agree about whether
an internal discipline policy for improper billing existed. Fourteen of the twenty-five firms could
not agree whether the firm had a policy in place for detecting improper billing practices. That is,
between 25% and 75% of the respondents from these fourteen firms agreed that there was a policy
in place to detect improper billing practices. Respondents from eleven of the twenty-five firms
could not agree about whether a specifically designated ethics partner had been appointed.  Re-
spondents from eleven of the twenty-five firms also could not agree about whether the firm of-
fered scheduled training on ethics issues.
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either significant ignorance that the ethics policy or procedure exists or sig-
nificant disagreement about whether it fits within the definition given.
TABLE NINETEEN: CONCERNS ABOUT IMPROPER BILLING PRACTICES, BY








Firm has a policy in Yes (n = 161) 24% 76%
place to detect improper No (n = 46) 57% 44%
billing practices? Don’t know (n = 108) 40% 60%
Total (n = 315) 34% 66%
There are also no correlations between the proportion of lawyers in a
firm reporting that certain ethics policies or procedures are in place and
ethical outcomes. This is hardly surprising given that there is very little
agreement within firms about the existence of such policies and procedures.
It may be that the main impact of ethics policies and procedures is
indirect and relates to lawyers’ perceptions of their work environment
rather than directly to lawyers’ behavior. That is, if an individual lawyer
feels that the firm is monitoring his or her colleagues’ behavior, he or she
will feel comforted that those colleagues are not behaving unethically (see
the section immediately above)—but this does not mean that ethics policies
necessarily have any direct, independent effect consistently throughout the
whole firm.120 There is evidence from studies of rule-following behavior
that people are more likely to comply with rules if they believe that their
colleagues and competitors will be caught and punished if they do not fol-
low the rules.121 Psychological studies also suggest that people feel others
need to be deterred from breaking the rules, but that they themselves will
119. Pearson Chi-square p = 0.000: value = 18.795, df = 2.
120. The whole question of what impact law firm ethical infrastructures (and internal business
ethics and compliance programs) have on actual ethical behavior is a complex and contested one.
It is safe to say, however, that evidence, theory, and common sense all suggest that the impact of
such systems will be variable and contingent. See Christine Parker, Adrian Evans, Linda Haller,
Suzanne Le Mire & Reid Mortensen, The Ethical Infrastructure of Legal Practice in Larger Law
Firms: Values, Policy and Behaviour, 31 U.N.S.W. L.J. 158, 161–72 (2008); Christine Parker &
Sharon Gilad, Internal Corporate Compliance Management Systems: Structure, Culture, and
Agency, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 170 (Christine Parker
& Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011).
121. See Sally Simpson & Melissa Rorie, Motivating Compliance, in EXPLAINING COMPLI-
ANCE, supra note 120.
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behave ethically without the need for rules because it is the right thing to
do.122 Indeed, deterrence measures might prove to be counterproductive.123
VI. ANALYSIS AND POTENTIAL INTERVENTIONS
The problems of billable hours have triggered a debate regarding the
merits of time-based billing over, for example, value-based tenders or
event-fee substitutes. There is no consensus as to which ought to prevail.124
In reality, lawyers face an insoluble conflict of interest when billing their
clients;125 time-based billing arguably rewards inefficiency,126 while fixed
fee agreements may encourage fee earners to perform work with minimum
effort.127 As Bartley points out, “there is nothing inherently wrong with
billing on the basis of time spent—provided the time is productive, re-
corded fairly and charged at an appropriate rate.”128
The results of our survey confirm that “many of the legal profession’s
contemporary woes intersect at the billable hour.”129 We have uncovered a
series of clear phenomena that influence lawyers’ working environments in
a way that can push lawyers towards unethical behavior. These factors in-
clude not only billable hours but also the culture of competition and law-
yers’ assumptions about other lawyers.130 Lawyers and the firms for which
they work need to address these factors. It seems clear that unethical behav-
ior would continue to exist—albeit perhaps less acutely—if an alternate
billing method replaced billable hours. Firms can, however, counter the per-
ceptions that influence a lawyer to engage in unethical billing by correcting
the cultural disconnect and clarifying that lawyers can achieve high status
by honest means.
122. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Individuals As Enforcers: The Design of Employee
Reporting Systems, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE, supra note 120; Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel,
The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protec-
tions for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1190–91 (2010).
123. Feldman & Lobel, The Incentives Matrix, supra note 120, at 1182 (citing a finding that
fines can act as a price for purchasing the right to perform the undesirable behavior).
124. See, e.g., Webb, supra note 18, at 39; Gibbs, supra note 3, at 18–19 (reporting the chal-
lenges faced by Australian firms seeking to respond to client discomfort with time-based billing);
see also Steve Mark, Comm’r, NSW Legal Servs. Comm’n, Address at the Sydney Finance Es-
sentials for Practice Management Conference: Analysing Alternatives to Time-Based Billing and
the Australian Legal Market (July 18, 2008), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/
olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/Analysing_Alternatives_to_Time-Based_Billing_July_2007.pdf/$file/
Analysing_Alternatives_to_Time-Based_Billing_July_2007.pdf (describing various alternative
billing methods and the market pressures forcing firms to adopt them).
125. Webb, supra note 18, at 40; Ross, Ethics of Hourly Billing, supra note 2, at 24–25.
126. See Spigelman, supra note 3.
127. Bartley, supra note 18, at 12. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 69 n.41, for a list of cases
in the United States involving misconduct relating to fixed fees.
128. Bartley, supra note 18, at 12.
129. Hirshon, supra note 4, at ix.
130. Id.
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A. Cultural Disconnect
First, junior lawyers labor under the strong and consistent impression
that the value of their work is assessed primarily on the basis of the fees that
they earn. When given the opportunity to nominate “other” issues which
would count toward lawyers’ performance reviews, one respondent to the
Survey commented: “This firm is all about the money and while they say
and like to pretend that other things matter, in reality they don’t. It is all
about how much money you make the partners.” This view is incorrect to
the extent that partners are considerably more optimistic about the extent to
which other aspects of a lawyer’s work are considered when management
assesses that lawyer’s performance. These responses are consistent with
Fortney’s report of “a disconnect between partners and associates [whereby
many] associates do not feel committed to their firms and partners do not
feel committed to associates.”131
Lawyers who perceive that their firms are only interested in revenue
production may feel a direct pressure to bill and a reduced motivation to
deal with files efficiently. Less directly, lawyers’ reduced loyalty to the firm
may cause declining loyalty to the firm’s reputation. Especially where sev-
eral lawyers work on one matter, and any individual lawyer’s billable hours
are merged with other lawyers’ charges, the client’s dissatisfaction with ex-
cessive billing is likely to be directed at the firm, rather than the lawyer
individually. As a result, unethical lawyers are somewhat shielded from the
possible consequences of their actions. Firm leaders therefore need to know
what employed lawyers are thinking and talking about instead of feeling
comfortable that they are sending the right messages from on high.
B. Ethical Confusion
Second, a subset of lawyers do not have strong views about the inher-
ent ethical character of bill padding. To them, allegations that padding is
unethical beg the question of why they should only be entitled to charge for
their marginal costs. Instead, they look to their firm’s policy for guidance
on these issues. This can be problematic, not least because employees at
many firms cannot agree whether a policy even exists.
Disagreement about whether a policy exists and what a policy requires
has a cascading effect. Some lawyers—who have not derived an ethical
judgment from first principles—might engage in questionable practices be-
cause they are unaware of a policy that seeks to prevent unethical behavior.
There is also evidence that when the answer is ambiguous or unclear, peo-
ple will choose the response that is self-serving. The perception that some
lawyers engage in such practices might cause other lawyers, who have ar-
rived at an ethical judgment and previously refrained from such practices,
131. Susan Saab Fortney, Leaks, Lies, and the Moonlight: Fiduciary Duties of Associates to
Their Law Firms, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J. 595, 616 (2010).
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to change their behavior, if not their minds, simply because they now need
to “keep up.”
C. Interventions
These results suggest that, as discussed above, the appropriate locus
for remedial action is the firm itself. Firms also have the greatest ongoing
need to develop appropriate interventions as they will suffer most from the
negative publicity or poor reputation132 that unethical billing practices
generate.
Commentators who argue that competition and greed are the primary
causes of billable hour fraud suggest eliminating minimum billing require-
ments; changing the compensation culture amongst lawyers to avoid creat-
ing incentives to commit billing fraud; rewarding people for the quality of
their work, not the quantity; rewarding other activities, such as mentoring;
providing reduced-hour incentives that still provide the possibility of mak-
ing partner; installing professional management personnel to administer and
audit firm billing practices; and using alternative billing methods.133 These
commentators suggest that clear billing guidelines, training on billing, and
monitoring of guidelines are insufficient.134 As one respondent noted:
Here’s the thing . . . you can do all of the surveys of this nature
that you want to. The firms can produce pretty policies which say
all of the right things. However, while the driving force behind a
lawyer’s advancement is time recording, you will always have an
issue with time sheet padding and ‘time theft’. Younger lawyers
in a firm, despite all their high ideals, will always fall into line
with what the firm wants, and will not be empowered to do any-
thing differently.
It is nevertheless clear that policies, as well as their discussion and
enforcement, do have some role to play in preventing or decreasing the
temptation to engage in unethical billing practices. This paper has shown
that the existence of ethical infrastructure may not affect lawyers’ percep-
tions of a pressure to bill. It can, however, reduce their suspicions that other
lawyers are billing unethically and reduce direct observations of unethical
billing. Policies should inform staff about which practices are considered
ethical or unethical, put processes in place to detect and investigate unethi-
132. See Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 173 (2008); see also Webb, supra note 18, at 58 (showing how lawyers and firms can send
quality signals to clients in order to prevent clients from receiving low quality service and to
ensure that clients who have received quality service will pay for that service).
133. See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 23, at 916–21; Susan Saab Fortney, I Don’t Have Time to
Be Ethical: Addressing the Effects of Billable Hour Pressure, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 305, 316–18
(2003) [hereinafter Fortney, Time to be Ethical]; Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 2, at 292–98;
La Rue, supra note 12, at 495–99.
134. Lerman, supra note 23, at 916–21; Fortney, Time to be Ethical, supra note 133, at
316–18; Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 2, at 292–98; La Rue, supra note 12, at 495–99.
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cal practices, and set out penalties for employees who engage in unethical
behavior. Clear, well-publicized and well-enforced policies should provide
guidance for well-meaning but ill-advised lawyers by helping them resist
informal pressure (real or perceived) to lower their practice standards.135
Firm policies need to be detailed enough to authoritatively instruct
lawyers as to what factors constitute proper billing. The policies should
start with how time is to be recorded but go on to include such matters as:
(1) whether it is necessary to take contemporaneous notes of time spent on
files; (2) whether, if travelling for a client, efforts will be made to use the
time spent travelling to do work on the client’s behalf (preferably on the
same file); (3) the impermissibility of recording fictitious hours or double-
billing; (4) the necessity of keeping more detailed time entries to make it
easier for clients and management to assess a lawyer’s efficiency;136 and (5)
that if lawyers wish to charge a premium for work performed, they should
charge an hourly rate greater than the normal rate.137 These policies must
address the challenge discussed above—that lawyers are producing a prod-
uct, not providing a service and can therefore bill on the basis of the overall
value to the client or the overall costs to the firm. Lawyers will view ethical
guidelines that do not engage with this challenge as circular. Accusations of
misconduct will be more persuasive if they analyze the agreement between
the lawyer and the client. If the agreement specifies that the lawyer will
charge on the basis of time, then the lawyer is acting fraudulently by pad-
ding his or her bill, no matter what work has been done previously.
If firms institute such policies, they must ensure their staff is aware of
them. This paper supports previous literature clearly showing that many
employee-lawyers are not aware of such policies.138 Partners and directors
who assume that their employees are aware of the firm’s ethical infrastruc-
ture risk their firm’s reputation with their complacency.
D. Clients
Regulators considering the problem of unethical behavior should also
consider empowering clients to challenge such behavior and excessive bill-
ing. It is clear that “less sophisticated consumers of legal services” have
difficulty assessing whether lawyers’ bills are fair and reasonable.139 Client
empowerment should therefore occur through procedures aimed at ensuring
that otherwise unsophisticated legal consumers are in the best position to
develop an informed understanding of the product they should receive from
135. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline,
16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 338 (2003); Nelman, supra note 9, at 730.
136. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 83, 111.
137. See Lerman, supra note 10, at 866.
138. Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 2, at 253 (noting that 24% of the 1999–2000 Associate
Survey respondents did not know whether the firm had any written billing guidelines).
139. See Fortney, Time to be Ethical, supra note 133, at 314.
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a given firm. The first stage in this process requires the lawyer to inform the
client of both the material elements of the fee agreement (that is, the ser-
vices for which the lawyer charges and how much the lawyer charges for
each service) and the lawyer’s billing practices (that is, how the lawyer
plans to calculate the amount owed for each service).140 An attorney should
warn prospective clients, for example, if the attorney customarily bills a
minimum of a quarter of an hour for any activity, even for a one-minute
call.141
The second stage in this process requires the lawyer to provide the
client with information to enable the client to make appropriate comparative
assessments. This might involve:
1. Information about how much of the total time billed to a file
was actually billed to the client (known as the realization rate).
The realization rate is a measure of a lawyer’s overall efficiency;
if a law firm charges its clients for every single minute that its
lawyers spend on the client’s file, that suggests either perfectly
efficient lawyers or a failure to scrutinize the effectiveness of the
lawyers’ actions.
2. Current and past costs of handling similar projects.
3. A detailed summary of what needs to be done on the client’s
matter and what problems might arise.
4. Statistics setting out the usual time lawyers spend on different
types of cases.
5. Asking firms to address some kind of standardized problem,
such as a contract, which the firm could process and cost out.
6. More sophisticated clients going to tender on legal services
could also seek information about tenderers’ ethical monitoring
and auditing practices.142
E. Future Research
We have concluded that lawyers in private practice would likely com-
pete on matters associated with their budgets, even if they were not subject
to set billable hours requirements. It may be, for example, that a list of
earnings would operate to undermine ethical practices, even if there were no
billable hour budgets. This conclusion is inferential and not based on clear
responses. The billable hours system is so pervasive that it is difficult to
140. Richmond, supra note 5, at 74, 77 (citing judicial interpretations of Model Rule 1.5
established by In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boeltner, 985 P.2d 328, 336–37 (Wash.
1999) (en banc) and In re Discipline of Dorothy, 605 N.W.2d 493, 501 (S.D. 2000), respectively).
141. Ross, Ethics of Hourly Billing, supra note 2, at 71. In Australia, if the practitioner does
not disclose the minimum unit of time billing, the courts have held that the practitioner is only
entitled to recover charges in accordance with the actual time that has elapsed. See Moray v Lane
(No. 15084) 1993 NSW LEXIS 8322, at *4–5 (N.S.W. Sup. Ct. 1993) (Austl.).
142. See Suzanne Le Mire & Christine Parker, Keeping It In-House: Ethics in the Relationship
Between Large Law Firm Lawyers and Their Corporate Clients Through the Eyes of In-House
Counsel, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 201, 202, 211–12, 226 (2008).
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find enough lawyers and firms using an alternative system to test the differ-
ence with confidence.143 Further quantitative studies with sufficient data to
test the impact of different billing systems on specific unethical behaviors
would be useful. Further research might also use qualitative research meth-
ods including in-depth interviews, participant observation, analysis of docu-
ments to understand how “billable hours” operate in lawyers’
consciousnesses, and practices compared with other billing systems and
performance measures. Does the ease of quantification of billable hours
mean that time-based billing creates a more one-dimensional technology of
control over lawyers’ thinking and behavior than other measures of earn-
ings and performance would? Or are all billing systems and performance
measures subject to similar pressures to become one-dimensional exaggera-
tors of competition and greed within the firm? These are also questions for
law firm managers to experiment with in trying to create supports for ethi-
cal behavior and discussion within their firms.
Empirical research on the issue of billable hours has so far been lim-
ited to surveys about respondents’ views of the frequency of unethical be-
havior and their perceptions about the pressures to engage in such behavior.
This method provides a useful start to a discussion about how perceptions
can influence behavior. Research based on self-report surveys and inter-
views, however, can only report respondents’ subjective perceptions of the
pressures upon their billing practices and their concerns about unethical
conduct in their firms. They do not seek, and cannot provide, objective,
verifiable evidence of misconduct. Quasi-experimental research might be
useful in order to better test whether partners’ optimism or employee law-
yers’ pessimism is more accurate. One possibility for further research
would be to provide respondents with a series of archetypes of lawyer be-
havior (e.g., a high biller who is inefficient, a high biller who may be acting
unethically, a low biller who engages in significant pro bono activity, and
so on) and ask respondents to predict each archetype’s rate of advancement
and likely compensation if employed at the respondents’ firms. Ideally, re-
searchers would gain access inside law firms to conduct in-depth ethno-
graphic research via participant observation to understand both lawyers’
perceptions of conduct and ethics around billing practices and to observe
how this emanates in practices.144
143. Sufficient data from firms with different billing systems was not available in this study.
See supra note 70.
144. For a survey of the different ways of doing empirical research on compliance and non-
compliance (which might broadly include ethical and unethical behavior) and their strengths and
limitations, see Christine Parker & Vibeke Nielsen, The Challenge of Empirical Research on
Business Compliance in Regulatory Capitalism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 45 (2009). For an
example of the type of ethnographic research suggested here (in relation to compliance with scien-
tific research ethics requirements), see Susan Silbey, Ruthanne Huising & Salo Vinocur Coslov-
sky, The “Sociological Citizen”: Relational Interdependence in Law and Organizations, 59
L’ANN ´EE SOCIOLOGIQUE, 201 (2009).
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CONCLUSION
This paper began by reviewing the literature on lawyers’ ethics and
billable hours in Section I. Commentators have suggested that the main fac-
tors that cause unethical billing practices are competition within a firm for
higher levels of compensation and ignorance of appropriate ethical prac-
tices. We argued that these factors will remain whether or not a billable
hours regime is in place.
The remainder of the paper used data from the Queensland Billing
Practices Survey (described in Section II) to provide some empirical evi-
dence from lawyers inside law firms about the role of billing practices in
their lives, and the extent to which billing practices create ethical pressure
for them.
Section III showed that law firm lawyers who responded to the Survey
perceive their firm environments to be dominated by billable hours and per-
ceive their own performance to be assessed primarily by the revenue they
generate. Section IV examined their perceptions of unethical billing prac-
tices in their firms and the extent to which they personally feel ethical pres-
sure from time-based billing. Unsurprisingly, those subject to billable hour
targets feel greater pressure to bill and, to a lesser extent, have greater ethi-
cal concerns about their firms. However, we do not find any clear correla-
tion between billable hour targets and a sense of pressure to bill. What we
do find is some firms where a high proportion of lawyers feel pressure to
bill and have a high degree of concern about the unethical billing practices
of others, and other firms where this is not the case.
Section V considered law firms’ attempts to establish ethics policies to
counter unethical billing practices. We find little evidence that these di-
rectly prevent unethical billing, but we do find that they help lawyers feel
less concerned that others might be engaged in unethical practices. There-
fore, we suggest that these systems can help build a positive ethical envi-
ronment around billing.
Section VI applied the lessons from the Survey to the interventions
commonly suggested as appropriate to reduce unethical billing. We con-
clude that there is often a “cultural disconnect” in law firms between part-
ners and employee-lawyers in which junior lawyers feel that their firms are
only interested in revenue production while senior lawyers feel that they
value ethics and quality first. There is also a degree of confusion among
some lawyers about the ethical status of various practices in relation to
time-based billing which some see as unethical “padding” and others see as
appropriate recognition of the value of the service provided. We suggest
that firms should set clear policies about appropriate billing practices and
ensure that they are appropriately communicated. Moreover, partners
should make themselves aware of how junior lawyers perceive the culture
and billing practices of their firms, rather than assuming that policies have
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been clearly communicated and implemented. Finally, more could be done
to ensure that unsophisticated clients receive clear information about billing
practices so that they are empowered to prevent unethical behavior.
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